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ABSTRACT 
 
Bank failure prediction remains an important economic issue.  Although prior research investigates 
bank failure prediction, the opportunity to improve predictions exists.  The purpose of this present 
study is to investigate the possibility of improving prediction of bank failure by including loan 
default variables and regional variation in prediction of bank failure. The results of statistical 
analysis indicate loan default measures contain information content both in their own right and also 
incrementally above that of traditional CAMEL measures.  Furthermore, statistical analysis utilizing 
logit regression shows the superiority of bank failure prediction models that include consideration of 
geographic region.   
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
.S. history indicates that bank failures have been a recurring problem with the highest post-depression 
levels occurring in the late 1980’s.  More specifically, Amos (1992) reported for the 39-year period 
1943-1981 that the average numbers of bank closings were six per year. In contrast, during the seven-
year period from 1982-1988 the average per year failure rate had increased to 115.  Bank failure rates in the 1990s 
declined from the high level in the 1980s, and the number of failures decreased to 11 in 2002 (FDIC, 2002).   
 
Although the number of failures may have decreased since the mid-1980s, even a single large bank failure 
can be catastrophic.  A belief existed in the early 1980s that certain banks were considered too large to fail, but 
subsequent failures have proven the belief incorrect.  The economic effects of bank failures have varied in levels up to 
billions of dollars for an individual bank e.g. $3.86 billion First Republic Bank Corporation, 1988. (Amos, 1992).   
 
Bank failures have continued into the new millennium along with their resulting costs. For example, the 
failure of Nextbank resulted in resolution costs to the FDIC of $526 million in 2002 (FDIC, 2002), and Southern 
Pacific’s failure caused $100 million in resolution costs in 2003 (FDICG, 2004). Further, these FDIC resolution costs 
do not include additional outlays related to the layoff of workers, loss to suppliers and other related organizational 
costs (Altman, 1984).    
 
As Marini (2003) notes, bank failure prediction remains an important economic issue.  Given the significant 
losses associated with even one individual bank failure, prediction of bank failure represents a continuing and critical 
issue.  Even the best of the existing predictive models have scope for improvement.  The present research examines 
loan default measures, as factors for improvement in bank failure prediction.     
 
GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
Previous research investigating the prediction of bank failure provides a foundation for assessment of bank 
health, but the bank failure models utilized in the prior studies exhibit scope for improvement.  This present 
U 
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investigation focuses on three areas for improvement in prediction of bank failure:  (1) whether loan default measures 
contain predictive information,  (2) whether loan default measures exhibit incremental information relative to other 
measures utilized in traditional predictions, and (3) whether a regional factor contains information useful for 
improvement in the assessment of bank failure. 
 
Loan Default Measures and Risk 
 
Research exists that examines loan default measures, but no discussion has explained the logic for their 
inclusion in predictions of bank failure (Cole et al., 1995; Cole and Gunther, 1998; Kocagil et al., 2002; Kolari et al., 
2002). An argument exists that loan default measures capture information about risk for particular assets of a bank and 
would thus be useful in predictions of bank failure.  Sundaresan (2001) presents arguments associated with the 
importance of developing proxies to capture the significant, but unobservable, dimensions of risk.  In relation to the 
utilization of loan default measures in bank failure prediction, the present research focuses on proxies for credit risk, 
which may additionally capture a facet of operational risk.   
 
Incremental Information Content of Loan Default Measures 
 
Some might present an argument that loan default measures provide little or no incremental benefit when 
examined in conjunction with traditional predictive measures. In contrast, an argument can be presented that loan 
default measures viewed in isolation do provide information to improve bank failure prediction.  This present study 
examines the incremental information content of the loan default measures above that of traditional measures. 
 
Information Content Related to Geographic Region  
 
Loan default problems and any resulting bank failure can be associated with exogenous factors not under 
management's control, such as general economic conditions. Exogenous factors include conditions related to a 
particular geographic area.  Each geographic region can be argued to exhibit diverse characteristics relative to other 
regions, related to aspects such as the type of loan concentration, regulatory setting and unique socio-economic 
environment.   
 
Facets of a region’s characteristics may have an impact on the number of bank failures. Prior research (Barth 
et al., 1990) examines region as a factor in bank failure prediction, but results have been inconclusive.  Gaining an 
understanding of the effects of regional influences on bank failure prediction may enhance the effectiveness of models 
for prediction of bank failure.   
 
LOAN DEFAULT: INTUITION, THEORY, AND HISTORICAL AND RESEARCH EVIDENCE 
  
At least four sources provide support for the contention that loan default measures may improve the 
prediction of bank failure. First, intuitively, improvements in predictions could be obtained through the inclusion of 
information related to loan default, as loans represent a bank's largest asset.  If risk develops during the collection of a 
bank’s loans, a greater probability of weakness and failure evolves.  Several arguments exist to support this intuitive 
view.   
 
Theoretical Support 
 
Berger et al. (1991) propose that adjustments to risk-based capital specifically for loan default disclosure 
would increase the accuracy of capital adequacy requirements.   In theory, credit losses and the related loan default 
disclosures would correlate with the bank’s capital requirements to enrich the understanding of inherent risk.  In the 
capacity of a proxy for risk, loan default information could prove useful in the prediction of bank soundness. 
 
Theoretically, information about post-contract default risk commensurate with loans would be expected to 
provide information for assessment of at a minimum a bank's credit risk and subsequently assist in assessment of 
overall financial health.  More specifically, loan default measures provide loss information in the form of evidence 
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about a bank's willingness and ability to deal with loan default problems, which essentially represents a banks' 
involvement in credit risk management and indirectly relates to operational risk.  The occurrence of risk relates to 
post-contracting events, where a debtor's repayment is less than the contract amount and is contingent on unknown, 
unfavorable and uncontrollable outcomes.  The resulting risk relates not only to individual credit loan risk, but also 
affords evidence of management’s attitudes toward risk.  
 
Reported loan default disclosures that contain differing levels of discretion include non-accruing loans, past 
due loans, loan loss reserves, loan loss provisions and net loan charge-offs.  Milne (2002) supports the idea of 
discretion, indicating that management has both the incentive and capacity to control loan portfolio risk.  In any given 
time period, managers have discretion in both the amount charged for loan loss provisions and the amount of loans 
written off. In comparison, managers possess relatively limited discretion to affect the level of non-performing loans.   
 
Historical Evidence 
 
Historical evidence from the circumstances surrounding the proliferation of bank failures in the 1980's 
provides further motivation for including loan default risk factors in bank failure prediction models.  A review of bank 
failure literature by Looney et al. (1989) reports that major factors associated with bank failures relate to loan losses, 
such as in deteriorating loan quality or poor loan/collection policies.  Various loan related factors recur as a theme in 
explanation of failure.   
 
General Research Evidence 
 
In general, research related to bank failure prediction has occurred through assessment of the usefulness of 
various financial measures (e.g., see Meyer and Pifer, 1970; Sinkey 1975; Martin, 1977; Sinkey, 1978; Pettway and 
Sinkey, 1980; West, 1985; Lane et al., 1986; Looney et al., 1989; Espahbodi, 1991; Thomson, 1991; Whalen, 1991; 
Amos, 1992; Tam and Kiang, 1992; Cole et al., 1995; Cole and Gunther, 1998; Kocagil et al., 2002; Kolari et al., 
2002). The factors examined include measures of loan default disclosure with utilization of a range of statistical 
analysis methods.  The reported results indicate inconclusive findings concerning the usefulness of loan default 
disclosures. 
 
Research tests the usefulness of loan default information for predictions of failure with utilization of several 
measures including the following: a ratio of provision for loan losses to operating expense (Sinkey, 1978); net loan 
recoveries to total loans, provision for loan losses to total operating expense and gross loan charge-offs to net income 
plus provisions for loan losses (Lane, 1986); a ratio of reserves for possible loan losses to total loans (Espahbodi, 
1991); provision for loan losses to average loans and net charge-offs to average loans (Tam and Kiang, 1992) net loan 
charge-offs to total assets and provision for loan losses to total assets (Kolari et al., 2002).  The researchers provide no 
evidence to support the contention that the loan default measures improve predictions of bank failure. 
 
Although the results from the above researchers did not confirm the usefulness of loan default measures in 
prediction of failure, other studies did provide preliminary empirical support.  Research findings of bank failure 
prediction that maintain the usefulness of loan default measures include the following variations: non-performing 
loans (West, 1985); total loans 90 days or more past due to net loans and leases and total non-accruing loans and 
leases to net loans and leases (Tam and Kiang, 1992); ratio of loans past due by 90 days or more plus non-accrual 
loans plus other real estate owned assets to gross assets (Cole and Gunther, 1995); past due loans, non-accruing loans, 
reserves for loan and lease losses, provisions for loan and lease losses and net charge-offs (Cole et al., 1995); past due 
loans and non-accruing loans (Cole and Gunther, 1998); allowance for loan losses to total assets (Kolari et al., 2002); 
and commercial charge-offs and installment charge-offs (Kocagil et al., 2002).   
 
In light of the incomplete and varying results in the aforementioned research and given the importance of risk 
to the evaluation of financial health, the present research examines the extent that measures of loan default can 
provide utility in the prediction of bank failure and whether they exhibit incremental information above traditional 
measures. 
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BACKGROUND:  CAMEL MODELS 
 
Bank failure prediction models generally contain traditional measures represented in the terminology of 
CAMEL.  The FDIC’s development of CAMEL originally occurs for the purpose of determining when to schedule 
on-site examination of a bank (Thomson, 1991; Whalen and Thomson, 1988).  The majority of prior research for 
prediction of bank failure focuses on capturing information representative of capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), 
management quality (M), earnings (E) and liquidity (L), where the combination of the five is designated as a CAMEL 
model.    
  
The five CAMEL factors indicate the increased likelihood of bank failure when any of the five factors 
embodied in CAMEL prove inadequate.  Although researchers have a common adherence to the broad guidelines 
available in the CAMEL criteria, previous studies for predictions of bank failure contained no consistent set of 
CAMEL measures.  The general choice of the five CAMEL factors occurs based on the theory that each represents a 
major element in a bank’s financial statements.  For example, one of these threats represented in CAMEL exists in the 
loss of assets (A).  Short-term liquid assets (L) aid in covering loan payment defaults and offset the threat of losses or 
large withdrawals that might occur.  The following research provides explanations for choice of CAMEL measures: 
Lane et al. (1986), Looney et al. (1989), Elliott (1991), Eccher et al. (1996), Thomson (1991) and Estrella et al. 
(2000).  
 
Hypotheses 
 
 In this present study, assessment of the information content of CAMEL and the loan default measures occurs 
in three stages.  The first stage relates to determining the information content of loan default measures without the 
influence of other measures, such as those in CAMEL.  A primary component of the loan default measures, non-
performing loans, is comprised of past due loans (90 days or more past due) and non-accruing loans (loans on which 
interest is no longer being accrued). In terms of discretion, these two measures of non-performing loans represent 
perhaps the most rigid measure of loan default risk, as there exists little room for management’s judgment in 
determining the amount to be recorded.  For example, when a loan becomes 90 days past due, it is automatically 
classified as a component of non-performing loans.  No judgement exists for management in the determination of the 
amount. 
   
 Theoretically, these two variables would be relatively more consistent in measurement between all banks due 
to lack of the aforementioned discretion. The other loan default measures include loan loss provisions, loan charge-
offs and loan loss reserves.  These three measures exhibit a higher level of discretion relative to the other loan default 
measures.  A manager must determine and record a reasonable amount for these loan default measures, but no 
consistent cut off time period exists for determination of the amount. 
 
The first hypothesis in the present research tests the following: 
 
H1: Loan default measures provide information content for the prediction of bank failure.   
 
An increase in the magnitude of the loan default measures theoretically signals a greater likelihood of bank 
failure. Thus, in a logit model to predict bank failure, a positive coefficient is expected for all of these variables. 
 
The second hypothesis examines the incremental information content of the loan default measures above that 
contained in general measures in published financial statements.   Examination of the additive value of these measures 
leads to the second hypothesis, which states: 
 
H2: Loan default measures contain incremental information content for prediction of bank failure in relation to 
CAMEL measures. 
 
Tests of the second hypothesis occur with inclusion of a ratio for each of the CAMEL measures.  Appendix 
A contains a summary of the definitions for the CAMEL factors examined. 
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The signs of the coefficients for measures of capital adequacy, management quality, earnings and liquidity in 
the CAMEL model are expected to be negative. As each of these measures decreases, the likelihood of failure 
increases.  Expectations exist for the measure of assets to exhibit a positive relationship with failure.  Since the asset 
measure (A) represents those loans that normally exhibit higher risk, an increase in that type of loan concentration 
(i.e., commercial and industrial loans) translates into a higher probability of failure. 
 
Examined exogenous factors consist of inter-temporal and regional aspects.  A priori, inter-temporal and 
regional differences could be expected to correlate with predictions of bank failure.  Correlation would occur given 
the notion that these two factors link to economic problems intertwining time and regional economic concentrations.  
Sudarsanam and Taffler (1995) note that a financial ratio provides information related to economic conditions and 
varies as the economy fluctuates.  In an examination of regional effects utilizing a dummy variable for state, Barth et 
al. (1990) provide evidence that region has insubstantial statistical significance in tobit estimations for the cost of 
resolution.   
 
This current research examines inter-temporal effects tested singly with resulting significance.  However, in 
further analysis with testing for the predictive ability for the combination of both inter-temporal and regional factors, 
the inter-temporal factor proved insignificant.  Further testing eliminated the inter-temporal factor in predictions based 
on the statistical evidence and the argument that the failures relate more closely to an aspect of a particular industry, 
geographic region or other economic factors.  For example, if the agricultural industry experiences a general 
downturn, the banks in that specific region that have issued a greater number of agricultural loans face a greater 
probability of failure. As an increasing number of farmers in the specific region experience unprofitable operations, a 
snowball effect would intensify the outcome for a bank in that region.  
 
 The third and final hypothesis tests regional differences as follows:  
 
H3:  Loan default disclosure measures contain information content for prediction of bank failure in regional models. 
 
Sample 
 
The failed banks included in the sample were identified from a FDIC listing for the time period 1985-1991.  
The sample includes 535 failed banks with each failed bank matched with a non-failed bank.  Nine hundred fifty four 
banks from the total sample (477 failed banks and 477 non-failed banks) are utilized in the development sample.  The 
holdout sample contains the remaining 116 banks (58 failed and 58 non-failed banks) from the 1991 time period.  The 
time period (i.e., 1985-1991) is chosen for study because of the significant number of bank failures occurring during 
these few years.  That is, a large data base of failed banks exist within a relatively short time period, which eliminates 
a portion of the noise that might exist in a model developed with bank failures over an extended period of time. 
 
The financial information for the 1070 banks is collected from Sheshunoff''s Bank collection, based on the 
preliminary year-end Reports of Condition and Reports of Income available from the FDIC.  Collection of the 
financial data for each bank in the development sample contains data for one year prior to the prediction year.  For the 
holdout sample, the sample includes data for one and two years prior to prediction.  The data collected for each 
selected bank included a ratio for each of the loan default measures and the CAMEL factors chosen.  Failed banks are 
defined as those that bank regulators deem as no longer viable and, therefore, subsequently are closed.   
 
Often previous development of prediction models occurs with data samples limited to one state or one 
geographic region of the U. S.  The current broad sample is comprised of relatively non-homogenous banks chosen 
from different states and regions in the U.S.  As such, the banks in the sample contained a variety of types of loan 
concentrations including industrial, real estate, oil and gas and agricultural loans.   
 
The development sample contains banks from six regions of the U.S. (i.e., Southwest, Southeast, Midwest, 
Rocky Mountain, West and Northeast). The holdout sample of 58 failed banks and 58 non-failed banks are from states 
in the southwestern U.S.    
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All predictive models include failed and non-failed banks, where a matching process occurs on the basis of 
asset size and state. The matched pair research design adds certain advantages.  Although collection of matched 
samples generally entails more cost, the research design controls for extraneous variables, which may be known or 
unknown (Lee and Li, 1993).  It also allows a closer investigation of the characteristic problems under investigation, 
as the sample includes a higher number of observations for the characteristic (i.e., bank failure) under study than 
would a sample that is proportional to the population. 
 
One view exists that criticizes a matched pairs design and purport the use of a sample based on the 
population proportions. In this current study, additional formulation and analysis to examine a population based 
conflict in views is performed. Details of the additional analysis are available from the authors.  
 
Method 
 
Evaluation in support of loan default usefulness in assessment of bank failure transpires with application of 
logistic regression. Logit regression assesses a binary dependent variable, such as failed or non-failed bank and 
typically produces a curvilinear response with an asymptotic (0 and 1) function.  The resulting logistic function can be 
linearized through a logistic transformation with little difficulty.   
 
The method allows the probability of an event, such as bank failure, to be estimated (Neter et al., 1985) using 
the maximum-likelihood method (Norusis, 2002).  The resulting choice results in the most probable or likely outcome.   
 
The errors resulting from the comparison can be classified into Type 1 and Type II errors.  A trade-off exists 
between Type I errors (the error made in wrongly predicting that a bank will not fail) and Type II errors (the error 
made in wrongly predicting that a bank will fail).  Type I errors normally exhibit a higher possibility of losses (i.e., 
costs) than Type II errors. Thus, in development of models for prediction, a common objective is to decrease the level 
of Type I errors, although a trade off with the Type II errors typically occurs.  
 
As noted, logit provides a score, typically between zero and one, which indicates the likelihood of the 
predicted state (failed or nonfailed bank).  Often, a cut off of .5 is chosen for classification.  However, as noted by 
Cole et al. (1995), cut offs other than the midpoint are useful for achieving high classification accuracies for 
identifying problems, in this case problem banks.  More specifically, lowering the cut off below .5 results in 
identifying more failed banks correctly, but at the cost of classifying more non-failed banks as failed.   
 
Results 
 
Table 1 exhibits the range, mean and standard deviation for the loan default measures, CAMEL measures and 
total assets.  The measures representative of asset quality (AA), management quality (MAN) and liquidity (LIQUID) 
exhibit greater variability, as evidenced by the higher standard deviations.   
 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation 
CAPAD 
AA 
MAN 
EARN 
LIQUID 
PROV 
NCO 
NONACC 
PASTDUE 
RES 
-8.90 
.00 
-19.30 
-39.00 
-692.37 
-1.31 
-1.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
29.78 
4.21 
209.10 
13.80 
94.32 
400.00 
29.40 
48.40 
102.00 
36.20 
7.6513 
24.6600 
14.4538 
-1.6713 
40.5934 
4.4676 
3.6796 
5.4037 
2.4564 
2.5966 
4.4371 
31.4400 
27.3448 
3.8138 
28.2644 
13.6400 
4.3077 
6.2357 
4.6051 
2.7899 
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CAPAD = (Equity Capital + loan loss reserves)/total assets x 100 
AA  = Commercial and industrial loans/total loans x 100   
MAN  = Percent change in loans during the past 5 years   
EARN       = Income before securities gains and losses/average total assets x 100  
LIQUID = [(Total assets-total loans)/total assets] x 100 
PROV  = Loan loss provision /average loans x 100 
NCO  = Net charge-offs of loans/average loans x 100 
PASTDUE = Loans 90 days or more past due/ total loans x 100    
NONACC = Loans on which interest is no longer accrued/total loans x 100  
RES  = Loan loss reserve/total loans x 100  
 
 
Table 2 provides the Spearman correlation coefficients indicating failure appears significantly correlated with 
each of the loan default and CAMEL measures. The majority of the coefficients exhibit significance at an alpha level 
of .000. Capital adequacy exhibits the highest correlation (-.815) with the measure of failure, followed by the measure 
of earnings (-.771) and net charge-offs (.637). Examination of the correlations for the independent measures indicates 
no serious collinearity.   
 
 
Table 2:  Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients (Rho) For Loan Default and Camel Measures 
 
  FAIL CAPAD AA MAN EARN LIQUID NONACC PASTDUE RES PROV NCO 
             
FAIL Rho 1.000 -0.815 0.299 -0.321 -0.771 -0.499 0.590 0.309 0.182 0.567 0.637 
 Sig.   0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.050 0.000 0.000 
CAPAD Rho  1.000 -0.153 0.323 0.715 0.406 -0.540 -0.240 -0.137 -0.459 -0.597 
 Sig.    0.101 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.141 0.000 0.000 
AA Rho   1.000 -0.043 -0.229 -0.216 0.171 0.013 -0.039 0.136 0.097 
 Sig.     0.650 0.014 0.020 0.067 0.891 0.677 0.147 0.302 
MAN Rho    1.000 0.272 -0.201 -0.319 -0.105 -0.080 -0.146 -0.207 
 Sig.      0.003 0.030 0.000 0.260 0.393 0.118 0.026 
EARN Rho     1.000 0.422 -0.572 -0.268 -0.319 -0.708 -0.698 
 Sig.       0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LIQUID Rho      1.000 -0.275 -0.185 -0.150 -0.279 -0.260 
 Sig.        0.003 0.047 0.109 0.002 0.005 
NONACC Rho       1.000 0.261 0.423 0.380 0.482 
 Sig.         0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PASTDUE Rho        1.000 0.147 0.348 0.284 
 Sig.          0.114 0.000 0.002 
RES Rho         1.000 0.292 0.241 
 Sig.           0.001 0.009 
PROV Rho          1.000 0.854 
 Sig.            0.000 
NCO Rho           1.000 
 Sig.            
 
 
In testing hypothesis one concerning the loan default measures, a logit model is developed for a 
comprehensive group of loan loss measures.  Table 3 (Panel A) presents the summary statistics and indicates that the 
model's in-sample classification accuracy is 85%.  With the exception of the loan loss reserves (RES), all of the 
components of loan default disclosure in the model exhibit statistical significance (.05 level) and the expected sign for 
the coefficient.  Subsequent models eliminate the loan loss reserve measure from testing. 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – September 2006 Volume 4, Number 9 
 8 
Table 3:  Tests of Hypotheses: Logit Models For Development Sample 
 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Sig Classification 
Accuracy 
A. 
NONACC 
PASTDUE 
RES 
PROV 
NCO 
Constant 
 
.2814 
.1382 
.0546 
.2864 
.1334 
-2.9652 
 
.0327 
.0402 
.0845 
.0716 
.0650 
.2075 
 
.0000 
.0006 
.5186 
.0001 
.0402 
.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85.0% 
B. 
CAPAD 
AA 
MAN 
EARN 
LIQUID 
Constant 
 
-.6719 
.0163 
-.0139 
-.8108 
-.0810 
7.8098 
 
.0795 
.0045 
.0058 
.0908 
.0124 
.8397 
 
.0000 
.0003 
.0167 
.0000 
.0000 
.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91.6% 
C. 
CAPAD 
AA 
MAN 
EARN 
LIQUID 
PROV 
NCO 
PASTDUE 
NONACC 
Constant 
 
-.7410 
.0220 
-.0085 
-.3317 
-.1049 
.2714 
.1835 
.0516 
.1509 
7.3365 
 
.8680 
.0051 
.0066 
.1049 
.0149 
.1013 
.1161 
.0194 
.0406 
.9238 
 
.0000 
.0000 
.1987 
.0016 
.0000 
.0074 
.1139 
.0078 
.0002 
.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93.2% 
 
NONACC = Loans where interest is no longer accrued/total loans x 100  
PASTDUE = Loans 90 days or more past due/ total loans x 100   
RES  = Loan loss reserve/total loans x 100  
PROV  = Loan loss provision /average loans x 100 
NCO  = Net charge-offs of loans/average loans x 100 
CAPAD  = (Equity Capital + loan loss reserves)/total assets x 100 
AA  = Commercial and industrial loans/total loans x 100   
MAN  = Percent change in loans during the past 5 years   
EARN  = Income before securities gains & losses/average total assets x 100  
LIQUID  = [(Total assets-total loans)/total assets] x 100 
 
 
Table 3 (Panel B) presents the results of logit regression for a traditional CAMEL model, as a benchmark and 
initial step in testing hypothesis two.  All measures exhibit significance at the .05 level or better with correct signs for 
each coefficient.  The model yields an in-sample classification accuracy of 91.6%.  
 
The next step in the examination of the incremental information content of loan default factors involve tests 
for the model containing the traditional CAMEL variables supplemented by the loan default measures.  Table 3 (Panel 
C) presents the results of the expanded model with traditional CAMEL measures supplemented by the loan default 
measures. The result presents in-sample classification accuracy of 93.2 % with the signs of all coefficients as 
expected.  All variables exhibit significance with the exception of the measures representative of management (MAN) 
and net charge-offs (NCO).   
 
One explanation for the insignificance of NCO relates to relative levels of discretion, where management is 
likely to have relatively more discretion over the amount of loan charge-offs recorded in a given period compared to 
other loan default measures.  The result is that the manager’s discretion obscures the information content of net 
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charge-offs.  For example, management of one bank might have a firm policy of charging off any loans over 180 days 
past due, while management of another bank may have no set policy for when to write off loans, but rather makes the 
decision on a loan-by-loan basis.  Thus, more “noise” exists in the form of other factors (policy) in arriving at the 
reported amounts of NCO and, therefore, it is more difficult to model discriminatory power. 
 
A chi-square test of the difference in the model’s predictive accuracy with the addition of the loan default 
measures to the CAMEL model indicates a significant difference at the .000 level.  Although the loan default 
measures alone provides good results (85%) and the CAMEL model by itself provides relatively accurate prediction 
(91.6%), adding the loan default measures to the CAMEL model improves the classification accuracy by a statistically 
significant amount.  These results provide support for hypothesis two.   
 
Subsequently, the coefficients from the development models are utilized to predict bank failure for the 
holdout sample. With the classification accuracy for models set at a .4 cut off, the resulting Type II error rates are 
relatively high at 25.86% and 22.41% for the CAMEL model and the expanded CAMEL plus loan default measures 
model, respectively.   
 
Cole et al. (1995) examined the trade off between Type I and II errors for three models: a CAMEL model, 
FIMS (Financial Institutions Monitoring System) and UBSS (Uniform Bank Surveillance Screen) model.  Their 
results are summarized in Table 4 for comparative purposes.   
 
 
Table 4:  Trade off in Type I and Type II Error Rates For Holdout Sample 
 
A. Type II error rate equals 5% 
 
 Type I error rate Type II error rate 
Cole et al. (1995)   
        CAMEL 32 % 5% 
        UBSS 28% 5% 
         FIMS 20% 5% 
Current Study   
         CAMEL 6.90% 5% 
         CAMEL Plus Loan default 3.45% 5% 
 
B. Type II error rate equals 10%  
 
 Type I error rate Type II error rate 
Cole et al. (1995)   
        CAMEL 22 % 10% 
        UBSS 16% 10% 
         FIMS  9% 10% 
Current Study   
         CAMEL 1.72% 10% 
         CAMEL Plus Loan default 1.72% 10% 
 
 
Application of the same procedure occurs in examination of the trade off between Type I and Type II error 
rates for the CAMEL and expanded CAMEL plus loan default measures model in this current study.  The results 
appear in Table 4 and provide two important findings.  First, at both levels of Type II errors [i.e., 5% (Panel A) and 
10% (Panel B)], the models in the current study achieve noticeably lower Type I error rates compared to that of Cole 
et al. (1995).   
 
Second, and more importantly, for the models in the current study, note that at a 5% Type II error rate (Panel 
A), the Type I error rate for the expanded model (containing loan default and CAMEL measures) exists at one half 
(i.e., 3.45%) the level of the Type I error rate (i.e., 6.9%) for the CAMEL model.   
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Figure 1 provides a graph of the Type I and Type II errors for the predictive results from the holdout sample.  
The overall error rate of the CAMEL model emerges as relatively lower than the error rate for the loan default (Risk) 
model confirming the results from development testing.   
 
Figure 1: Trade Off In Error Types For Holdout Sample
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However, Figure 1 indicates superiority for the predictive accuracy of the CAMEL plus loan default 
measures (i.e., the Risk-Camel) model in comparison to either of the other two models at the varying levels of risk.   
 
Regional Models 
 
As the CAMEL plus loan default model exhibits superior predictive ability, regional equations are presented 
for these expanded models for the four regions (Southwest, Midwest, Rocky Mountain and Southeast).  Due to 
missing data and small sample sizes, models could not be estimated for two of the regions (Northeast and West).  
Table 5 presents results indicating loan default measures continue to exhibit information content in the prediction of 
failure. 
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Table 5:  Logit Model with CAMEL and Loan Default Measures For Regions 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Region 1 
Coefficient 
Region 2 
Coefficient 
Region 3 
Coefficient 
Region 4 
CAPAD 
 
AA 
 
MAN 
 
EARN 
 
LIQUID 
 
PROV 
 
NCO 
 
PASTDUE 
 
NONACC 
 
RES 
 
Constant 
-2.004 
(.000) 
.033 
(.051) 
.022 
(.310) 
-.595 
(.042) 
-.245 
(.001) 
.382 
(.374) 
.750 
(.060) 
.995 
(.003) 
.710 
(.004) 
-.672 
(.201) 
16.060 
(.001) 
-.636 
(.000) 
.019 
(.006) 
-.014 
(.537) 
-.874 
(.001) 
-.099 
(.000) 
-.100 
(.696) 
.284 
(.235) 
.021 
(.483) 
.070 
(.114) 
.205 
(.376) 
7.541 
(.000) 
-.892 
(.000) 
.018 
(.217) 
-.010 
(.586) 
.013 
(.963) 
-.182 
(.005) 
.209 
(.799) 
.533 
(.397) 
.330 
(.285) 
.473 
(.065) 
-.393 
(.648) 
10.273 
(.006) 
-.494 
(.226) 
-.130 
(.260) 
-.103 
(.207) 
-1.910 
(.356) 
-.117 
(.119) 
.567 
(.803) 
-.042 
(.980) 
1.286 
(.078) 
-.002 
(.994) 
1.112 
(.172) 
6.588 
(.119) 
 CA = 96.6 CA = 91.6 CA = 97.0 CA = 98.8 
 N=268 N=310 N=135 N=94 
  
CAPAD = (Equity Capital + loan loss reserves)/total assets x 100 
AA = Commercial and industrial loans/total loans x 100   
MAN = Percent change in loans during the past 5 years   
EARN = Income before securities gains & losses/average total assets x 100  
LIQUID = [(Total assets-total loans)/total assets] x 100 
PROV = Loan loss provision /average loans x 100 
NCO = Net charge-offs of loans/average loans x 100 
PASTDUE = Loans 90 days or more past due/total loans x 100 
NONACC = Loans where interest is no longer accrued/total loans x 100  
RES = Loan loss reserve/total loans x 100 
REGION 1 =  Southwest 
REGION 2 = Midwest 
REGION 3 =  Rocky Mountain 
REGION 4  =   Southeast 
CA = Correct classification accuracy 
 
 
Past due (PASTDUE) and non-accruing (NONACC) loans in Table 5 display significance more consistently 
over the four regions than the other loan default risk measures.   Chi-square test statistics for differences with the 
addition of the loan default measures to the CAMEL models were .000 (Southwest), .110 (Midwest), .008 (Rocky 
Mountain) and .198 (Southeast).  
 
In testing the general model, net charge-offs (NCO) exhibit significance in the loan default model.  For the 
regional model, net charge-offs exhibit significance at a .06 level in the Southeast region.  Of all the prior bank failure 
studies, only the Kocagil et al. (2002) results support the usefulness of net charge-offs.  
 
Loan loss provisions (PROV) and loan loss reserves (RES) did not exhibit significance in any of the regional 
models.  Both of these variables may be affected by a significant level of managerial discretion and thus had the 
highest possibility of containing “noise” in relaying the managers’ views.  
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For the Southeast (Region 4), only a loan default measure (PASTDUE) displays significance at an alpha 
lower than .1.  An explanation for the usefulness of a loan default measure in the Southeast arises from the high 
proportion of real estate loans in the declining real estate market in the early 1990’s.  In addition, the change in the 
real estate market may have developed so rapidly that the capital adequacy measure did not have time to capture the 
change and therefore did not signal the problem.  The loan default risk measure appears to encapsulate the change 
more effectively. 
 
Further tests were performed to examine the predictive ability of the regional models from the Southwest 
region for one period ahead.  Generally, the results for the out of sample regional predictions exhibited superior results 
in comparison with those of the earlier models in this present study.  For example, for the CAMEL plus loan default 
measures model the classification accuracy increased from a general classification accuracy of 93.2% for the entire 
sample (Table 3) to 98.8% for the Southeast (Region 4), as shown in Table 5.  The results provide support for 
hypothesis three.   
 
Figure 2 provides a graph of the trade off in error types, which supports the contention that the loan default 
measures contain unique information by region.  
 
Figure 2: TradeOff In Error Types For Holdout Sample With Region Coefficients
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The location of the errors from both the CAMEL and the CAMEL plus loan default (Risk-Camel) regional 
model indicates lower errors and exhibits a higher curvature compared to the errors in Figure 1 for the general model.  
For example, at a 5% Type II error rate the general CAMEL model exhibits a Type I error rate of 6.9%, while the 
regional CAMEL model yields a lower Type I error rate of 3.45%.   
 
For the general expanded CAMEL plus loan default measures model, a Type II error rate of 5% accompanies 
a Type I error rate of 3.45%, while the regional expanded model exhibits a decreased Type I error rate of 1.72%.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present study provides supportive theory, evidence and substantiation through statistical analyses to 
support the contention of predictive ability in loan default measures. Loan default risk measures exhibit information 
not only singly, but also incrementally.  The results of the analysis support and extend prior research to indicate that 
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past due loans, loan loss provisions, non-accruing loans and net charge-offs provide significant information for 
prediction of bank failure.     
 
Regional models provide improved classification accuracy for bank failure prediction with provision of 
commonly lower Type I and Type II errors.  Not only did the regional models provide higher classification accuracy, 
but also interestingly the capital adequacy measure did not display significance in all of the regional models. In 
contrast, in the model where capital adequacy displayed no significant explanatory power, a loan default measure 
assisted in predictions.   
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Appendix A 
 
CAMEL Model 
 
Capital adequacy: 
CAPAD   =  (Equity capital + loan loss reserves)/total assets x 100 
 
Asset quality: 
AA          =  Commercial and industrial loans/total loans x 100   
 
Management: 
MAN       =  Percent change in loans during the past 5 years   
 
Earnings: 
EARN      =  Income before securities gains and losses/average total assets x 100     
                                                 
Liquidity: 
LIQUID    =  [(Total assets-total loans)/total assets] x 100 
 
Definitions: Loan Default Measures 
 
PROV: The category of loan loss provision provides the amount of loss recognized in the current year, 
where the amount is probable and reasonably estimable by bank management.  Discretion exists in this amount, 
especially as to the timing due to associated tax savings.   
 
NCO: Net charge-offs measure the net amount of loans written off during the year less the recovery of any 
previously written off loans.  These loan write-offs are considered less discretionary, as they are normally adjudged 
based on consideration of the time period the loan has been outstanding and deemed delinquent. 
 
PASTDUE: Loans whose payments are 90 days or more past due, but interest is still accruing on the loans.  
 
NONACC: Non-accruing loans occur when the cash basis is applied for interest income because of substantial 
uncertainty as to the collectibility (normally at least 90 days delinquent).   
 
RES: The loan loss reserve (allowance for loan losses) category reports the amount for the balance sheet 
account used to reduce the loan receivable balance to its estimated collectible value. 
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NOTES 
 
